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**THE 1990S: A DECADE OF TRANSITION
TO A NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY ORDER**

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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

The 1990s promise to be a decade of major structural change in Europe--the most profound restructuring of the political, economic and military balance of power in Europe since the Second World War. The United States has a critically important role to play. Whether or not we emerge at decade's end with an enduring role in the European security equation consonant with our interests depends critically on correctly assessing the changes now underway, having clear goals and a roadmap to guide the process.

This essay examines the multifaceted nature of change now sweeping Europe: in Soviet policies; in the peaceful democratic revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe; in the coming unification of Germany; in the strengthening of the political integration of the EC; in the pan-European security environment beginning to take shape in the CSCE process; and, inevitably, in the need to adapt NATO to Europe's new security needs.

My central thesis is that the U.S. has an enduring geopolitical interest in Europe's security, and that interest can best be pursued by maintaining an institutional link between the U.S. and the democracies of Western Europe. By extending deterrence to the NATO European states the U.S. has for forty years helped maintain the balance of power in Europe; that role must continue.

As Europe changes, however, NATO must adapt and so must our

role in Europe's security:

- First, NATO must be sufficiently flexible to include a unified Germany.
- Second, NATO must accommodate the emerging Europeanization of Europe's defense.
- Third, the U.S. role in NATO must change, with fewer commitments consonant with our reduced available resources.

This paper addresses these issues and highlights the enduring role of extended nuclear deterrence and the new role of reassurance for fostering stability in post-Cold War Europe. Key milestones for the 1990s which will be critical to the successful completion of the process of European security transformation are also listed.

II. THE NATURE OF CHANGE

The impetus for change has been building since the Iron Curtain descended, artificially dividing Europe and Germany, and freezing the continent in a bipolar nuclear confrontation. While the desire for change has been evident throughout Europe, the nature of change has been radically different in East and West.

Following forty years of crises or violent explosions in the East, peaceful change finally arrived in 1989 in a dramatic series of political revolutions brought on by the sudden collapse of brittle, dogmatic Communist regimes. These revolutions, in turn, were made possible by the Kremlin's loss of self-confidence resulting from the continuing downward spiral of the Soviet economy. Particularly striking was Moscow's decision not to use force to prop up the unpopular regimes of its East European glacis,

thereby repudiating the Brezhnev Doctrine.

However, Marxist-Leninist ideology continues in the Soviet Union and formidable military power, nuclear and conventional, remains the sole source of Moscow's superpower status. Gorbachev's attempts to restructure the Soviet economy are intended to reinvigorate, not bury, communism. Hence, prudent caution should be our watchword as Eastern Europe attempts the next stage of political and economic renewal.

In the West, by contrast, change has been evolutionary, befitting democratic societies and market economies. From the physical and psychological rubble of two world wars, West European societies have re-emerged, Phoenix-like, as major economic powers, thanks in large measure to enlightened U.S. policies: the Marshall Plan and the umbrella of extended nuclear deterrence codified in NATO. The renewed prosperity of West European societies, exhibited in the "single market" goals of EC-92, has had a major centripetal pull on Eastern Europe, (witness Gorbachev's call for a "common European home" as a means of gaining access to Western technology and investment).

As Western Europe has gained in self-confidence and economic power relative to the U.S., the post-World War II West-West relationship has come under increasing strain. Two sources of strain have been trade friction (e.g. EC agricultural subsidies and restrictions) and "structural frictions" within NATO. Frictions in NATO include arguments over burdensharing, differing concepts of flexible response, and the role of nuclear forces. These

frictions have been compounded by fiscal mismanagement in the U.S. Budget deficits are placing the U.S. military contribution to NATO under intense political strain in Washington. Added to the increasing tempo of change is the pending unification of Germany. This single development--German unification--will reshape the strategic contours of Europe.

III. U.S. INTERESTS

As all of these interacting elements of change are joined it is critically important that we maintain a clear grasp of U.S. national interests, in order to develop sound political and military strategies. Briefly, our interests in Europe are:

- maintain the balance of power with the Soviet Union (a deterrence strategy);
- contribute to stability in Europe as Germany unifies and as ethnic rivalries re-emerge in Eastern Europe (a reassurance strategy);
- support West European integration and ensure U.S. institutional ties to Western Europe (both a geopolitical and economic imperative).

Due to our geopolitical position, it is vitally important both for the U.S. and Europe that we remain a major player in the European security equation. Like Britain in the 18th and 19th centuries, the U.S. in the 20th century has been and in the 21st century will continue to be the world's geopolitical island nation, separated by the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans from the potential hegemonic power on the Eurasian landmass. In the 20th century the U.S. emerged as the world's pre-eminent maritime power, the fulcrum

balancing continental power in Eurasia.

In order effectively to counter any hegemonic power threatening control of Eurasia, we require alliances with the key economic powers on the Eurasian periphery. During the bipolar nuclear age, the U.S. has pursued a policy of containing the Soviet Union. Our military strategy has been deterrence, especially nuclear deterrence, which has linked the U.S. to Europe through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. As this bipolar age evolves into a looser multipolar balance of power, for geopolitical reasons the U.S. and Western Europe will continue mutually to profit from a continuing institutional link. This in turn argues for adapting NATO to the more complex multipolar European environment which is beginning to emerge.

IV. ADDRESSING THE ISSUES

A. The Soviet Union: From Containment to Engagement

Since his ascendancy to power in March 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev has captivated the world. A Communist able to exhibit a human face, he has attempted to reinvigorate a badly ossified and corrupt system of state management. Caught between failed ideology, economic decline and counterproductive foreign policies on the one hand, and on the other witnessing the West pull further ahead as the world enters the technological age, Gorbachev has attempted bold reforms under the twin standards of glasnost and perestroika. He has unilaterally reduced the military, withdrawn Soviet troops from Afghanistan, diminished expensive support to other regional conflicts in Africa, Asia and even Central America, and improved

Moscow's human rights performance.

In a major break with the past, Gorbachev has agreed to asymmetrical arms cuts and on-site verification regimes in arms control, signed a "double-zero" INF Treaty (for which he has been hailed in Western Europe and the U.S.) and is now moving toward significant START and CFE agreements. Most dramatically, he has repudiated the Brezhnev Doctrine in an effort to allow reformist regimes in the Warsaw Pact to pave the way for renewal in the Soviet Union. However, despite his apparent calculations, the reform efforts in Central and Eastern Europe developed a life of their own in 1989 and rushed into full-fledged peaceful revolutions whose models are the pluralistic societies of the West.

The result of Gorbachev's policies is that Russia has been stripped of its external empire (except for the lingering presence of the Red Army garrisoned in East Germany) and is under increasing strain from ethnic tensions in its internal empire--the non-Russian Soviet republics. Glasnost has opened the Soviet system to domestic criticism and potential political pluralism beyond anything witnessed since 1917. However, the economy continues its slide, perestroika increasingly is a failure, and the only claim the Soviet Union has to superpower status is its armed forces, especially its modernized nuclear forces. Despite a proclaimed new military doctrine of "reasonable sufficiency" emphasizing defensive intent, the Soviet Union possesses formidable military power.

This means the United States needs to develop new policies which both deter and engage the Soviet Union; we must move beyond

containment in order to secure a more stable and peaceful world. Our engagement policies need to include both bilateral negotiations with Moscow and the strengthening of the CSCE framework to provide a forum to address pan-European security issues. However, we must not lose sight of geopolitical realities. Our "deterrent shield" will still be necessary in order to balance the latent military potential of the Soviet Union worldwide and especially in Europe.

B. Fostering Stability in Central/Eastern Europe

For the purposes of fostering stability among the current non-Soviet Warsaw Pact states it is useful conceptually to divide these states into two general groups. The first may be referred to as "Central Europe": the GDR (soon to be integrated into the Federal Republic of Germany), Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and potentially also the Baltic states. All have a long history of largely Western values transmitted through the Roman Church, Renaissance and, to varying degrees, the Reformation. These states will benefit from Western economic assistance (especially Poland) and association with Western political and economic institutions. While stability cannot be assured, assuming economic and political reforms take hold, Western economic assistance is sufficient, and the Soviet Union does not meddle in their internal affairs, these states have at least a prospect of emerging by decade's end more stable and playing responsible roles in a new European security order.

The West can support reform (pluralistic democracy and market

economies) in these Central European societies through a step-by-step process of encouraging their participation in Western institutions: Associate status followed by membership in the Council of Europe and European Parliament, membership in the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), observer status and eventual membership in GATT and the OECD, and possibly associate status with the EC. Thus institutionally by the year 2000 Central Europe could resemble the current European neutral states (Austria, Finland, Sweden, Finland and Switzerland), that is, part of the West politically and economically but without military alliance to Western Europe.

Bulgaria, Romania and much of Yugoslavia do not share many of the political and cultural traditions of the newly democratic Central European states. Like Russia, they are East European, with traditions which are either Orthodox or Ottoman Turk. The grafting of Western political and economic institutions onto these societies is problematic at best. Therefore, increasing the use of the CSCE process as a forum for discussing, investigating, influencing and regulating the internal and external conduct of the USSR and the states of Eastern Europe is as much as can reasonably be expected in the decade ahead.

The NATO countries can actively promote stability in Eastern Europe by institutionalizing the CSCE process (although without creating a mammoth new bureaucracy) through: annual Foreign Ministers' meetings (a modified contemporary Concert of Europe), a CFE verification monitoring regime and expanded CSBMs (perhaps

utilizing military liaison missions), and a rapporteur system utilizing liaison officers in Allied embassies to report on implementation of all three CSCE baskets (especially human rights practices) in each of the East European states and especially the Soviet Union.

Thus during the 1990s Europe cannot expect to see the end of history, but rather the return to history. While Central Europe may be fertile ground for the planting of at least some Western institutions and values, Eastern Europe and the USSR may be wracked by tension and instability. Localizing and containing problems as they emerge will depend critically on the strength of Western institutions (the EC and NATO), the pan-European CSCE process, the role of the U.S., the cooperation of the USSR, and the direction of German unification.

C. Deepening the Integration of Western Europe

The EC is well on the way to completing an internal market, probably by the end of 1992. Thatcher notwithstanding, we can expect the EC also to move toward monetary and economic unity during this decade. Mitterrand and Kohl are now advocating moving beyond "European Political Cooperation" to eventual integrated political and security policies and institutions for the EC. How far this process will go and how quickly cannot now be predicted. It is, however, fundamentally in our national interest to encourage this general integrative process provided the EC upholds free trade and the U.S. is permitted appropriate entree to the strengthened European Community institutions. Since the Kennedy Administration,

we have advocated a more equal "European Pillar" in NATO; the integrative process now occurring in the EC can become that European Pillar.

Regardless of how far the EC eventually integrates, however, during the 1990s Western Europe will continue to rely upon the U.S. to balance Soviet power, even as Europe seeks accommodation with Moscow. The emerging political institutions of a deepened and strengthened EC will still be too fragile to be able confidently to negotiate with Moscow, much less to withstand or challenge any renewed Soviet coercion without support from the U.S. For example, the conclusion, implementation and monitoring of CFE, START and enhanced CSBM agreements, and the coming negotiation on SNF will all depend on the strength of the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

Thus, Europe will continue to need the U.S. both to deter and engage the Soviet Union. Conversely, the U.S. will need the EC to influence the direction of change in Central and Eastern Europe via assistance, trade, investment and political dialogue. The West-West dimension of the East-West engagement is increasingly becoming a complex symbiotic relationship; Western Europe has gained relative position as the East-West engagement has become multidimensional, but the U.S. connection remains critical to lower East-West tension which is the sine qua non for European security and prosperity.

D. Anchoring a Unified Germany in the West

Critical to the entire process of European change will be the agreements reached in the Two-Plus-Four process leading to de jure

German unification. The U.S., Britain, France and the FRG have a vital stake in ensuring that a unified Germany is a full participant in Western institutions, especially the EC and NATO. Therefore, unity should occur by reconstituting and incorporating the five German Laender which are now the GDR into the FRG via Article 23 of the Federal Republic's Basic Law, rather than through a new all-German constitutional convention which would re-open primordial questions of Germany's identity and orientation and could shatter the Western institutions in which Germany is a member.

However, given Soviet neuralgia on the German question (and varying degrees of anxiety among several other European states), the exact German role in NATO and NATO's role in Germany are issues very much on the table, and decisions affecting Germany's status will have to be taken quickly in the Two-Plus-Four negotiations in 1990, before the FRG's next elections. Therefore, rather than provide Germany a "special status" in NATO which ultimately could feed both neutralist (standing between the U.S. and USSR) and nationalist (second class status) tendencies in Germany, we should consider changing NATO to accommodate a united Germany in a re-ordered trans-Atlantic security relationship.

Following German unification there will inevitably be a transition phase involving awkward security arrangements, since Soviet troops will still be on Eastern German soil and NATO forces will be in the West. While CFE-mandated asymmetrical reductions should bring Soviet forces down to no more than 195,000 men in

Central Europe by the mid-1990s, this anomalous situation cannot be permitted to continue. It could lead to domestic political pressure in Germany to remove all foreign forces and it could encourage radical fringe groups on the right and left. A high NATO priority, therefore, must be the early removal of all Soviet combat forces from German territory, indeed, from all of Central Europe, during this decade.

The Soviets do have a legitimate stake in ensuring their security is not adversely affected by German unity. The Soviets originally advocated German neutrality but this did not resonate well among European governments. Gorbachev is now suggesting a unified Germany could belong to NATO but must maintain associate status in the Warsaw Pact for an interim period until both alliances are replaced by a pan-European security structure. Rather than entertain such potentially dangerous notions, the West must formulate appropriate security guarantees to offer Moscow during the Two-Plus-Four and CFE negotiations.

Foreign Minister Genscher has advanced a plan to exclude all NATO forces, including the Bundeswehr, from Eastern Germany during the transition phase. While superficially attractive, this plan contains a major flaw if extended beyond the date on which all Soviet forces withdraw. A unified Germany would be a NATO member and consequently NATO forces stationed in Western Germany would be expected to defend all German territory and would need to deploy forward during a crisis. (This contingency could be very destabilizing if the status of Eastern Germany as part of NATO's

territory is left ambiguous.) If the Bundeswehr were to be indefinitely excluded from Eastern Germany, including the capital of Berlin, the history of the disarmed Rhineland of the 1930s would very likely come back to haunt Europe.

Far better that the security transition phase include the following steps: First, be as short as possible; Second, have Germany renew its pledge not to acquire nuclear, chemical or biological weapons; Third include explicit guarantees of Germany's borders, especially with Poland; Fourth, have the U.S. UK, France and the FRG obtain Soviet agreement to negotiate substantial CFE and CSBM regimes in Vienna to monitor and verify limits on all of the CSCE participants' forces in Europe (to the Urals)--this would apply to Germany but without singularity. Follow-on CFE negotiations should, inter alia, remove all Soviet forces from Central Europe, limit the size and location of remaining non-German NATO military forces on German territory, and limit the size of a future all-German force to less than current Bundeswehr strength, without impediments on where German forces may be stationed on German territory (a key sovereignty issue for Germany).

The Soviets will almost certainly also demand the removal of nuclear weapons from German territory, and possibly the removal of non-German NATO forces. Such demands ,if mishandled, would cut to the heart of current NATO Flexible Response Doctrine and could impede collective security--NATO's raison d'etre. Unfortunately, if such Soviet demands were made a precondition for removal of

Soviet forces from a unified Germany, they could resonate well among much of the German public.

We, therefore, need to think carefully about future NATO force deployments. If all Soviet forces are withdrawn from Central Europe, the role of U.S. stationed forces and especially nuclear forces in Central Europe will change. Germany will, for the first time, no longer be a frontline state menaced directly by the Red Army and the current inner-German line will no longer constitute the Cold War's border. Thus, forward deployment of most U.S. combat forces and all SNF (nuclear artillery and battlefield ballistic missiles) will no longer be critical to Germany's security and could be withdrawn.

The Soviets most likely will also demand that air-delivered nuclear weapons be withdrawn from Germany since dual-capable aircraft (DCA) deployed to Germany potentially could strike Soviet territory. While retention of some U.S. DCA in Germany is highly desirable, since these systems are tangible evidence of U.S. extended deterrence, in the final analysis, this too must be a lower security priority than securing the removal of all Soviet forces from Germany and ensuring continued German membership in NATO. We should negotiate hard to retain the DCA option but realize that Germany's future NATO membership may look more like Norway's than that of the current FRG. Maintaining an adequate nuclear deterrent umbrella for non-nuclear NATO countries, including Germany, must be a subject high on NATO's agenda for rethinking strategy after the Soviets withdrawal from Central

Europe and Germany unifies.

Thus it is important that we establish now the parameters we seek for NATO in the new security relations that will emerge in Europe following German unity, Soviet withdrawals and CFE reductions. It is time to plan how we want to adapt the North Atlantic Alliance, and America's role in NATO, to the new Europe which will emerge in the 1990s.

V. THE U.S. PERSPECTIVE OF NATO

Since 1950 when the first U.S. troops were deployed to Germany under NATO, the U.S. has clung to the goal of seeing an integrated West European conventional defense capability so that U.S. ground forces could be withdrawn. However, since the failure of the 1952 Lisbon Force Goals, the achievement of robust NATO conventional defense capability has been illusory. This has been one of the frustrations, indeed dilemmas, of extended nuclear deterrence. Given the differences imposed by geography and the power latent in nuclear arsenals, the U.S. and NATO Europe have never had a meeting of the minds on Flexible Response, the role of conventional defense, tactical, theater and strategic nuclear forces, trip wire defense versus real conventional combat capability, existential nuclear deterrence versus deterrence via limited warfighting options and escalation dominance.

As Western Europe's economic strength has grown, the frequency of Congressional calls for Europe to assume a greater share of the defense burden has also grown. Respected analysts of NATO from

Henry Kissinger to James Schlesinger and David Calleo have called for the devolution and reformulation of the U.S. role in NATO. Others, from George Kennan to Christopher Layne (and Charles De Gaulle) have seen the U.S. as an impediment to Europe regaining its own natural strength and, therefore, have called for U.S. disengagement.

All attempts to rethink the U.S. role have run into two barriers: the Red Army poised on the Elbe and bureaucratic inertia both in the U.S. and Europe. The first barrier is coming down; it is time to tackle the second. Now that the threat perception is finally being lowered and defense budgets are declining--in short, the immediate, military stakes are less than at any time in the post-war era--redefining NATO and the U.S. role in it may at last be possible. Accomplishing such a change, however, will be extremely difficult under the best of circumstances; proper timing and deft diplomacy will be essential.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A CHANGED NATO

In order to conceptualize a transformed NATO, it may be useful first to consider the security arrangements we would like to see in place in Europe by April 4, 1999 (50 years after the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty) and then consider the milestones necessary to get there.

First, as previously explained, our highest priority is to ensure that all Soviet forces are pulled back into the Soviet Union and reduced and constrained by binding CFE limitations. As these reductions occur and as German unifies, the 35-nation CSCE process

needs to be buttressed by a monitoring forum to verify compliance, administer and co-ordinate CSBMs, and provide the nucleus for a ministerial-level pan-European Concert-of-Europe-style security forum. Until Soviet forces withdraw completely from Germany and Central Europe, substantial U.S. forces, conventional and nuclear, should remain in Germany following the initial CFE reductions.

Second, when Soviet forces have completely withdrawn from Germany and Central Europe, and a CSCE pan-European security forum is functioning, the Cold War for all practical purposes will have ended. The U.S. will have fulfilled its critical post-war role in Europe and a major change in responsibility within NATO should occur. The time-frame for reformulating the U.S. role in a post-CFE NATO is 1995-1999, fifty years after the end of World War II, the founding of the Federal Republic and the North Atlantic Treaty.

The best place to turn for guidance on rethinking NATO roles and missions is the North Atlantic Treaty which is remarkably flexible in establishing the security framework for NATO. The relevant security obligations for each member state are: to "maintain and develop...individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack" (Article 3); to "consult together whenever...the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened" (Article 4); and to consider "an armed attack against one...an attack against them all", and to take "forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North

Atlantic area" (Article 5). As Michael Howard pointed out in his March 12, 1990 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture, these security articles are NATO's "bottom line".

NATO's integrated military command structure, troop deployments, and even NATO's political and military strategies are not mandated by the Treaty's articles and consequently need not be considered sacrosanct, but rather may be changed as circumstances warrant. Indeed, in 1949 the U.S. military role in NATO was envisioned to consist of maritime security and power projection via airpower; the European members were to provide the ground forces and air defense capability. Only after the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 when the fear of Soviet invasion of Western Europe became acute, did the Truman Administration deploy U.S. ground forces to Germany and recall General Eisenhower to active duty to organize an integrated command structure for NATO. With the ending of the Cold War it is time to change the U.S. role in NATO, and substantially reduce U.S. force deployments in Europe.

A. Recommended Changes in U.S. Force Deployments

The changes in forward-deployed U.S. forces we should seek include:

- Withdrawal of all U.S. land-based tactical nuclear weapons, thereby putting to rest an exceptionally contentious issue in Germany.
- Reduction in stationed U.S. forces in the central region to one Army division, a few TAC squadrons, with support forces and POMCUS for one corps which would be based in the U.S. and dedicated to NATO reinforcement as a mobile reserve.
- Maintenance, within reduced CFE-agreed ceilings, of air and naval forces in the UK, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Turkey, Greece and prepositioned equipment in Norway. U.S. Air

Force squadrons should be dual capable as evidence of U.S. extended deterrence strategy.

These limited U.S. forward-deployed forces should contribute both to deterrence and reassurance roles in the new European security environment that should emerge during this decade. Further, substantially reduced U.S. forces deployed in the central region of Europe--or dedicated to rapid re-inforcement--should be consistent with the reduced defense resources likely available to the U.S. (including strategic lift assets) and should more accurately reflect the changes in relative commitments within NATO of the U.S. and the European members. These changes in deployments and commitments logically will lead to changes in assigned roles and missions within NATO.

B. Recommended Changes in Roles and Missions

The changes in NATO roles and missions consistent with this new model include:

- Each NATO member state will assume primary responsibility for ground defense of its national territory;
- An integrated air defense structure under overall European command;
- "NATO Standing Forces" consisting of multinational units (small screening forces in the central region and rapid reaction forces for the flanks). The purpose would be to demonstrate collective security during crises, with the prospect that mobilized corps-sized maneuver forces from NATO states could reinforce the threatened region should hostilities occur.
- A "Europeanized" integrated NATO military command structure. As forward-deployed U.S. forces are reduced and tactical nuclear weapons withdrawn, peacetime command functions on the Continent should be transferred to European Generals who will exercise general command over European air defense and the NATO Standing Forces.

- The new U.S. mission will be to support an integrated Europeanized NATO defense structure through extended deterrence, maritime operations, power projection and potential re-inforcement.

As NATO roles and missions are re-allocated the all-critical nuclear deterrence functions also need to be re-examined by the U.S., Britain and France, NATO's nuclear powers.

C. Recommended Changes in Deterrence

The 1990s will witness several fundamental changes in nuclear force deployments which will alter the way we think about nuclear deterrence, including extended deterrence:

- All INF missiles will be eliminated.
- SNF will be withdrawn from Europe (presumably codified in a treaty).
- A START Treaty will reduce accountable U.S. and Soviet strategic warheads to 6,000 each.
- The composition of the U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear arsenals will change, with fewer ICBM warheads (for the USSR), fewer SLBM warheads (for the U.S.) and relatively more weapons on heavy bombers (as a percentage of aggregate weapons' totals).
- Both the U.S. and USSR are deploying nuclear-armed land-attack SLCMs.
- Thus far unconstrained by arms control, the British and French will MIRV their SLBMs, thus substantially increasing their weapons totals, although not necessarily the types of targets their weapons are designed to destroy (countervalue and "soft" or area military targets).

This leads to certain conclusions as we rethink nuclear roles for a transformed, more "Europeanized" NATO, yet an alliance in which the U.S. nuclear umbrella continues to provide extended deterrence. First, by decade's end the U.S. will no longer have 400 Poseidon C-3 SLBM warheads to assign to SACEUR, the current

policy. Our Poseidon force is being decommissioned and replaced by the more capable Trident C-4 and especially the hard-target capable D-5 on larger but substantially fewer Ohio-class SSBNs. In a START-constrained environment all U.S. SSBNs will either be committed to SIOP contingencies or assigned nuclear reserve roles. Second, assuming all Soviet forces are withdrawn into the USSR and are reduced, NATO's critical time-sensitive target list will similarly be reduced. Third, with the British and French MIRV programs, British and French SLBMs will be capable of holding at risk target sets in the Soviet Union that are currently assigned by SACEUR to U.S. SLBMs.

This change in availability of U.S., British, and French sea-based strategic nuclear forces raises interesting prospects for re-aligning the nuclear deterrence functions for Western Europe--and perhaps finally linking U.S., British, and French nuclear retaliatory capability in a coherent manner generally acceptable to all three nations. When taking his decision to withdraw France from NATO's integrated military command in 1966, DeGaulle spoke the unspeakable truth (since echoed by Kissinger and others) regarding nuclear deterrence: no foreign power itself hostage to nuclear attack can rationally guarantee retaliation against another nuclear power threatening a third country allied to the first, if such retaliation would mean risking the destruction of its own society. With the UK and France each independently capable of substantial retaliation, coupling to the U.S. nuclear deterrent shield should be enhanced.

The U.S. should take advantage of these coming deployment changes by assigning SACLANT--who would continue to be the U.S. CINCLANT--the responsibility for co-ordinating SSBN retaliatory options for the U.S. and UK (an appropriate limited number of assigned U.S. SLBM warheads could fulfill a regional counter-military subset targeting plan for the SIOP designated for NATO contingencies and the British warheads similarly would be NATO-assigned). Over time, steps could be taken to increase targeting co-operation with the French. The effect of this co-ordination should be synergistic and should enhance deterrence both by increasing Soviet uncertainty and by establishing a more politically acceptable basis for nuclear deterrence within NATO. Deterrence policy for NATO must be clearly formulated as a retaliation strategy, and this needs to be reflected in a reformulation of flexible response doctrine.

In addition, a robust extended nuclear deterrence posture will continue to require additional options in order to deter any conceivable Soviet limited nuclear coercion or threat of overwhelming conventional invasion. For these contingencies, the 1988 study entitled "Discriminate Deterrence" offers reasonable guidance. In discussing limited nuclear options, the study advocates emphasizing "discriminating attacks against military targets". These would utilize "new technologies of guidance and precision", and would "have the capability to destroy military targets...with low-yield nuclear weapons". For this role Dual

Capable Aircraft (DCA) from several NATO countries should be upgraded to enhance their ability to hold at risk a variety of targets, including military targets within the Soviet Union. Accurate, low-yield, standoff tactical air-to-surface missiles (TASMs) should be part of NATO's nuclear inventory.

However, basing of DCA aircraft is inherently vulnerable to nuclear or conventional pre-emptory attack. In order to reduce this vulnerability a limited number of U.S. nuclear-armed SLCMs (TLAM-N) could be assigned to SACLANT for specific NATO theater missions as an adjunct to DCA. Assigning SLCMs to NATO would present some difficulties; SLCMs have other roles (deterrence of war-at-sea and nuclear reserve), not all NATO allies favor SLCMs, and the Soviets place a high priority on eliminating U.S. land-attack SLCMs through arms control. Nevertheless, SLCMs could enhance extended deterrence by increasing flexible response options beyond DCA.

And, SLCMs conceivably could have an additional political value for NATO. If all nuclear weapons eventually are removed from Germany (a prospect we should not favor but recognize as possible), then SLCMs may provide a means for Germany still to participate in NATO's nuclear decision-making in the Nuclear Planning Group. It is worth noting that during the height of the INF deployment debate in Germany, Helmut Schmidt advocated SLCMs as the preferred response to Soviet SS-20s. Thus SLCMs may yet become an attractive option for bolstering extended deterrence and, consequently, we should not take any arms control steps now which would preclude

should not take any arms control steps now which would preclude assigning SLCMs to NATO in the future as the European security equation changes.

In summary, under this plan the U.S. would assume the following specific military missions within NATO:

- Extended nuclear deterrence roles consistent with a reformulated flexible response doctrine;
- Maritime missions and Naval/Marine flank support as today;
- Power projection including follow-on-forces attack utilizing USAFE squadrons;
- Reinforcement of the central region with an Army Corps (with elements forward-deployed and materiel and stocks prepositioned);
- Contribution to NATO Multinational Standing Forces to demonstrate collective security and thereby deter crisis escalation.

D. Narrative Explanation of Proposed Changes

If these proposed changes were to be adopted as U.S. policy when Soviet forces withdraw from Central Europe, current NATO doctrine of Forward Defense and Flexible Response (MC 14/3) would need to change. As the new NATO structure takes shape this model would result in a far greater European identity with European defense and security, and should allow the U.S. well before the end of the decade to assume a less visible and less expensive role more supportive of the power balance in Europe, rather than that of primary actor. Our presence and force posture would be greatly reduced, our missions more clearly defined and limited, and the critical nuclear deterrence tasks shared with the UK and France.

This model deliberately does not distinguish between the territories of the present FRG and GDR. After German unification, CFE reductions and removal of remaining Soviet forces from Eastern Germany, it would be illogical to make such a distinction. Since each nation would assume primary responsibility for the ground defense of its own territory and there will be an integrated European air defense net covering all NATO territory, the Bundeswehr will be expected to operate in Eastern Germany. Other NATO deployments to Eastern Germany would occur only if Soviet forces were to re-enter Eastern Europe. That prospect could result in the return to Germany of a U.S. Army Corps, possibly equipped with tactical nuclear weapons. This possibility should serve as a major disincentive to the Soviets as well as a major incentive to Central Europeans to keep the Red Army out.

Finally, although this model is not explicitly premised on France's re-entry into NATO's integrated military command structure, it is designed to facilitate a major change in French roles. It does foresee France's active participation in an integrated European air defense system and, at a minimum, it requires discreet agreement with the U.S. and UK over nuclear roles.

This model does provide France and Germany positive incentive to increase co-operation in enhancing the defense of the central region following U.S. withdrawal of most combat elements of its remaining Army Corps. A Franco-German integrated military structure, which could eventually include the UK, Belgium and the

Netherlands, is the logical next step. Such an enhanced Franco-German security arrangement would flow naturally from deeper EC integration (now officially advocated both by France and Germany), especially as the European Community assumes a greater political identity--a step the U.S. should encourage. This new French role need not contradict NATO's continuing relevance and the U.S. contribution to extended deterrence in Europe.

The fact that the threat level in the 1990s should be far lower than the preceeding four decades reduces the need for European security unity, but ironically the unification of Germany will provide incentive to both France and Germany, for their own reasons, to seek greater military coordination and possibly integration following further steps toward EC economic and political unity. Indeed, both Germany and France together may find it in their interest to insure a continued, although reduced, role for the U.S. in the new European security framework. France may be concerned that a unified Germany will be too powerful a presence in the new Europe without a continued American role, and Germany will be at pains to ensure that this perception does not become reality.

Under this model, the U.S. would obtain the resource reductions it seeks, yet bolster its position as an arbiter of European security and ensure a seat at the continental board of directors' table. We would no longer exercise day-to-day command of NATO forces, but our continuing nuclear, maritime, power projection, and re-inforcement roles will ensure major U.S.

decision power on critical security issues. We could begin this major change within NATO's MC 14/3, although successful completion of NATO's transformation should be codified in a new MC 14/4 which should emphasize both NATO's deterrence and reassurance functions for European security.

As these changes occur, the U.S. military strategy in Europe increasingly would take on the attributes of a cumulative strategy whose primary purpose would be to disrupt (and thereby deter) Soviet war plans. Our NATO allies increasingly would assume the responsibility for and costs of direct defense of European territory. This realignment of tasks within NATO would more closely correspond to our geopolitical position than has been the case since U.S. ground forces were assigned to the direct defense of the central region of NATO Europe in the fall of 1950. Therefore, the changes in NATO and new strategy this essay advocates should be sustainable over the long term as the pan-European security environment evolves and should require the commitment of fewer U.S. resources to the effort.

VII. MILESTONES FOR A TRANSITION DECADE

1990-1995: End Bipolar Division of Europe

- German de facto unity
- Two-Plus-Four negotiations conclude on security implications of a unified Germany
- CFE Agreement (U.S. and Soviets reduce to less than 195,000 troops in Central Europe)
- SNF negotiations
- START Treaty
- EC single market
- CSCE (CFE monitoring and CSBM mechanisms) forms basis for pan-European security forum
- All remaining Soviet forces withdraw from Germany
- U.S. announces withdrawal of tactical nuclear forces by 1995 (50th anniversary of the end of WWII, atomic bomb, and year NPT is to be reviewed)

1995-1999: Emergence of Multipolarity in Europe

- Each NATO member responsible for own territorial defense
- West European integrated air defense structure
- Creation of NATO Multilateral Standing Forces
- U.S. Corps withdraws; military roles delimited
- NATO's nuclear policy, strategy and doctrine are redrawn; British and French roles enhanced
- MC 14/4 agreed (deterrence and reassurance functions)
- All residual German sovereignty issues--stationing of Bundeswehr in Eastern Germany, status in NATO--resolved prior to 1999 (50 years after founding of a Western, democratic German state and 50 years after the North Atlantic Treaty)
- The EC develops deeper political unity for Western Europe, and French and German military co-operation forms the nucleus of a West European security pillar within a looser NATO Alliance.

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This essay results from several months' study of European security issues at the National War College. Most of the insights in this paper have been gained from lectures, seminar discussions and readings from the core curriculum and NATO and East European electives--all of which challenged me to reexamine previously held assumptions formed over a decade while working on U.S. and European security problems. Additional valuable source material for this essay topic is contained in the following bibliography.

Please note that the recommendations in this essay are solely my own and do not reflect the views of any of the following authors or the faculty or lecturers at the National War College.

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